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The compassionate decision-maker 
Abstract 
At times we respond to the predicament of another person with compassion. We come to an 
understanding of their difficulties and feel for them and suffer with them. Feelings of compassion call for 
an 'imaginative dwelling' on the particular circumstances of another. We will not have this experience or it 
will be misdirected if we do not treat the other person as an identifiable individual; someone with a 
particular history; someone with particular needs and desires. Compassion, in short, calls for particularity. 
The administration of the law, in contrast, calls for abstraction, it encourages an approach which treats 
people in general terms. Law's emphasis is on generality and the sameness of people; for justice 
demands that rights and obligations be applied equally, often irrespective of particular circumstances. 
That judges settle disputes according to law (and not moral principles or feelings) and that bureaucrats 
administer without affection or illwill are regulative ideals of our legal and administrative structures. 




Of these states the poet is the equable man...
He bestows on every object its fit proportion, neither more or
less...
He judges not as the judge judges, but as the sun falling around a
helpless thing...
He sees eternity in men and women, he does not see men and
women as dreams or dots.
Walt Whitman, from By Blue Ontario ~ Sho~e.l
A t times we respond to the predicament of another person with com-passion. We come to an understanding of their difficulties and feelfor them and suffer with them. Feelings of compassion call for an
'imaginative dwelling' on the particular circumstances of another.2 We will
not have this experience or it will be misdirected if we do not treat the other
person as an identifiable individual; someone with a particular history;
someone with particular needs and desires. Compassion, in short, calls for
particularity.
The administration of the law, in contrast, calls for abstraction, it encour-
ages an approach which treats people in general terms. Law's emphasis is
on generality and the sameness of people; for justice demands that rights
and obligations be applied equally, often irrespective of particular circum-
stances. That judges settle disputes according to law (and not moral prin-
ciples or feelings) and that bureaucrats administer without affection or ill-
will are regulative ideals of our legal and administrative structures.
Compassion is concerned with a person's particularity while law conceives
of its subjects in universal tenns. To this observation could be added the
remark that compassion is something we would expect to experience in our




compassion is something we feel, something which involves the emotions,
while the application of the law is usually thought of as an intellectual
affair. Without elaborating these ideas, there would appear to be at the least
a degree of tension between experiencing compassion for another and deci-
sion-making by way of law. What then are the prospects for compassion
playing some role in the world of law? To put it more crisply, how can
compassion be understood in legal terms? These are harc~ly new questions.
For example:
i. It was the pessimistic conclusion of Max Weber's influential writ-
ings on modernity that compassion and law have come to belong to differ-
ent cultural spheres. In modern times the sphere of law, he claimed, is so
dominated by types of thinking which are irreconcilable with the values of
compassion that these feelings can exist, if at all, only in the realm of the
personal. Our structures of law have come to be inhabited solely by 'spe-
cialists without spirit, sensualists without heart' .
ii. Kant's practical philosophy is based on the rational will; a will
motivated by duty not by the inclinations. As has been frequently pointed
out, the primacy given to practical reasoning seems to allow no place for
feelings in legal or moral deliberation;3 the emotions being too partial and
inconstant to provide a reliable ground for proper action.
111. Carol Gilligan's work on the ethics of care has had a large influ-
ence upon legal theory, as upon other areas of study. It is not an uncommon
experience to read a law journal article which proposes that we re-under-
stand some area of legal life around the notion of care or that we inject
more love or empathy into legal relations.
In this paper I do not respond directly to Weber's wintry assessment. But
the example I make use of could be seen as running counter to his predic-
tions.4 There is much more to Kant's practical philosophy than I have sug-
gested. There is always much more to Kant and I summon him up towards
the end of the paper.
As for the more recent calls for a place for the emotions in legal life or,
more particularly, for an infusion of care or compassion into decision-mak-
ing5; these claims would appear at times to miss the mark. For, with my
topic in mind, who would say that a judge or a bureaucrat should not be
compassionate? Perhaps someone who wanted to make analytic points
about the appropriate framework for understanding law or about the mean-
ing of the principle of justice. But these conceptual quibbles aside, who of
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interest would recommend that legal officials be without pity? Isn't the
problem, rather, that granted that a decision-maker should be compassion-
ate,6 how should this official respond in the circumstances of each case Of,
from a different perspective, how do the particular legal structures encour-
age or inhibit this response?
To make this point more generally, one would be surprised to learn of a cul-
ture which did not treat compassion as one of its more important moral
nonns. The question then is not the presence or absence of the demand that
people should show compassion towards each other. What is interesting
rather is the differences in meaning of this demand both between morali-
ties of different times and within moralities of the same period. For exam-
ple, Seneca praised the generous spirit of the slave-owner who was not
cruel to his slaves. We take the absence of croelty in this relationship for
granted; not as a display of compassion. Or, to come closer to our own
times, it would not be unusual for the victims of a natural disaster to be
given shelter for the night by their fellow citizens. Yet in everyday cir-
cumstances one would have to be a saint or a bit mad to take in homeless
people.7
I take from the above that the question to be asked is not should legal offi-
cials be compassionate, for of course they should. But, rather, what does
this demand amount to in the circumstances? And, more crucially, how can
a compassionate decision be achieved within a legal order?
I
To assist my argument I would like to consider an example drawn from
immigration law. This is an area of legal life in which concepts based on
compassion have been developed within the law. Here the decision to grant
or refuse a right has turned at times on tests of extreme hardship or preju-
dice; tests which appear to import into law some special concern for the
plight of others.8 Australian immigration law is especially interesting in
this regard. The notion of 'compassionate grounds' has been an important
parrof immigration law here since 1981. These provisions are thicket-like
in their complexity and their reception by the Courts is complicated. But I
need only consider one strand of this history.9
In December 1990 the Australian Migration Regulations were changed and
persons who were longstanding illegal entrants were given a limited fonn
of amnesty. 10 They could make regular their stay if they could show that
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between a stipulated date and the present they were the 'spouse', 'depen-
dent child', 'aged parent', etc. 11 of an Australian citizen (or permanent res-
ident). The regulation went on to provide in reg 131A(1)(d)(v) that an ille-
gal entrant was entitled to an entry permit if:
there is any other compassionate ground for the grant of an entry
pennit, to the effect that refusal to grant the entry permit would
cause extreme hardship or irreparable prejudice to an Australian
citizen or Australian pennanent resident (emphasis added).
The application of reg 131A(l)(d)(v) has involved three separate bodies.
The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs has processed some
7,600 applications under this regulation and as far as I can tell the courts
have dealt with appeals from these applications on approximately 32 occa-
sions. I shall consider the application of this regulation from the perspec-
tive of the Immigration Review Tribunal, an administrative body which
stands between the Department and the Courts. Since 1991 this Tribunal
has heard some 1200 appeals against Departmental decisions based on reg
131A(l)(d)(v).
The Tribunal can only grant an entry permit under 131A(l)(d)(v) to a per-
son who comes within the stipulated criteria. To be successful the applicant
must establish a 'compassionate ground' on the basis of a refusal causing
'extreme hardship' or 'irreparable prejudice' to an Australian citizen (or
permanent resident). Clearly, to apply this regulation the Tribunal must
have reached an understanding of ~compassion' over the years which has
allowed it to make distinctions which it can justify between deserving and
non-deserving applicants. How has it been able to do this? How has it fash-
ioned a test of compassion sufficiently objective for law's purposes? The
answer in short is that Tribunal members do not work with only the facts
of the case and their personal feelings. A judgment about compassion, like
all judgments is not simply a private affair. It is made by a member of a
specific community in a particular social context. In this case the institu-
tional context in which the Tribunal operates makes available to the deci-
sion-maker material both to come to an initial assessment of whether a
compassionate ground exists and to question this assessment. A number of
sources of these criteria can be readily identified.
First, there is the source of linguistic meanings. Members may consult dic-
tionaries or other works and ponder the meaning of compassion and its dif-
ference if any from, say, pity or sympathy and they may reflect on the
meaning of the terms 'extreme hardship' or 'irreparable prejudice'.
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Second, as the notions used in reg 131A(l)(d)(v) can be assumed to have
some point or purpose, the meaning of these words can be considered in
the light of these purposes. Just what are the purposes at work here will, of
course, often be a matter of debate. For example, it was repeatedly said
that, as the Migration Act and Regulations were beneficial legislation, reg
131A(l)(d)(v) should be construed in ways that furthered the interests of
applicants and their Australian sponsors. But it is not hard to argue that
Migration law serves other interests as well. 12
Third, as is not uncommon, the Minister issued directions as to how this
regulation should be applied by other officials. This was done in a way
which was binding on the Tribunal, insofar as these directives were con-
sidered to be consistent with the Migration Act. These Ministerial guide-
lines offered specific advice for testing particular claims and in this way
operated to channel the Tribunal's discretion.
Fourth, the Tribunal is subject to judicial review by the Courts and a body
of case law soon developed concerning the concepts used in reg 131A.
Most significant here were two ideas. First, that 'extreme hardship' and
'irreparable prejudice' were separate notions ana that while hardship was
quantified - it had to be extreme - prejudice was not. It was enough, in other
words, if the prejudice evoked compassion (as well as being irreparable).
Second, because reg 131A(1)(d)(v) spoke of 'any other compassionate
ground' it was helpful to ask whether the relationship established in any
particular case was analogous to one of the other relationships specified
earlier in the regulation (ie the relationship of spouse, or dependent child,
etc.).
Now speculation about the meaning of words or the purpose behind these
words or a consideration of policy directives or the decisions of Courts are
all orthodox legal techniques. And what is involved in these activities calls
f~r no further explanation, even if the detail in this particular example is
unfamiliar. Instead I will comment upon a fifth source of criteria, namely,
the Tribunal's own records. For a considerable body of decisions has been
generated over the years as the Tribunal has justified its application of reg
131A(l)(d)(v) in case after case.
II
Even a cursory look at this material shows that while each case has its own
unique facts, a number of typical problems recur. For example, many ille-
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gal entrants base their claim to compassionate treatment upon the medical
assistance, psychological support, child-care or financial assistance which
they give to an Australian citizen. Or they point to the emotional hardship
which would be suffered by an Australian citizen if he or she - their lover,
family member or close friend - was required to leave Australia; emotion-
al hardship possibly compounded by the Australian citizen's anxiety for the
illegal entrant's welfare 'back home'. Parents who are 'illegals' argue that
their Australian citizen child would suffer extreme hardship if they were
required to leave Australia with them. Employers submit that they will suf-
fer financial loss or that positions will be shed if a key employee is forced
to depart. Members of a religious community suggest that they will expe-
rience spiritual loss if they are deprived of the services of a particular per-
son; and so on.
A Tribunal member familiar with these and other typical examples has a
sense of what has been accepted in the past and what has been rejected; and
more importantly, how other people have assessed and weighed different
parts of these arguments. They know) for instance, that far less weight has
been given to the argument that the illegal entrant provides child care or
financial assistance than the claim that they provide Dursing care or other
fonus of medical support. They know, again, that a distinction has been
made at times between the psychological distress caused by separation
from close friends and the psychological distress which is the result of anx-
iety for the safety of those persons, if they had to return to their country of
origin.
The first point I make about these received stories is that they provide some
content and direction to the Tribunal's thinking. Without these stock exam-
ples and the distinctions which they generate Tribunal members could not
properly grasp the salient features of the cases before them. It is through
reading these examples that members educate themselves about what they
should treat as relevant, about what is legally significant in the instant case,
if the compassionate ground is to be made out. Exemplary stories, in other
words, help to constitute the meaning of compassion in this context.
III
The second point to note is that while particular stories or examples are
necessary for decision-making they can also work in ways which restrict
the possibilities. Stories can ossify into rules; analogies with earlier deci-
sions can be drawn in a lazy or unimaginative way. Stock examples may
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be, as Kant is quaintly translated, the 'go-kart' (the children's walking
frame) of judgment (1929: 178); but they can also limit our capacity to
understand others. Fortunately there is more to the topic of compassion
than can be found in the records of the Immigration Review Tribunal.
Members have available to them many other stories about compassion.
First to mind is the parable of the Good Samaritan from the New Testament
or perhaps the meeting of Priam and Achilles after the death of Hector in
the final Book of the Iliad. My own favourite example, or rather negative
example, comes from that exquisite moment in Proust when Swann tells
Mme Guerrnantes and the Duke that he cannot accompany them to Italy
next summer as he is terminally ill. But, of course, these three examples of
compassion, or the lack of it, are hopelessly highbrow. Any proper account
of how people from our cultural tradition come to an understanding of
compassion would have to treat the pedagogical role of many different
types of stories - from Aesop's Fables to episodes of Full House. And this
is not meant to describe an ascent.13
Clearly, I cannot address this large topic in the space of this paper. But I am
not unhappy to point in the direction of the writings of Martha Nussbaum.
For the relationship between emotions and narrative - how we learn about
compassion, say, from the stories that are told to us ;;. is a basic theme of her
work.14 In any event I don't need to identify which stories in order to make
the point that Tribunal members would have heard many stories about
compassion. And this puts them in the position of always being able to
rethink the Tribunal's decisions in the light of this larger cultural inheri-
tance. If the narratives which can be found within the Tribunal's records
help make decision-making in this area possible, the availability of other
stories always presents the possibility of standing back from and evaluat-
ing these records. In this way the meaning of compassion in 131A(1)(d)(v)
can be and is regularly re-understood.
IV
Stories about compassion form part of what I will call, following Kant, the
community's common sense. Decision-makers cannot but be exposed to
these stories and they are an important source of the 'tertium quid' which
is necessary for the public justification of their decisions. But how will the
compassionate decision-maker operate? How should he or she think of this
interplay between these received stories and the instant case? Or, more
generally, how should the particular facts be understood in the broader
legal context? A not uncommon response to these questions is to call upon
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the decision-maker to make a proper assessment of the situation, one which
takes into account all of the relevant concerns. Sensible as this is, every-
thing now turns on the notions of proper and relevant.
To achieve a proper assessment decision-makers may be exhorted to be
imaginative, flexible, open and responsive. IS But after saying this, expla-
nation for how to arrive at a 'proper discernment of the particulars' would
appear to give out; and it is hard to see how more concrete guidance could
be given. However, while it is foolish to expect a science of deliberation,
one which could direct the act of judgment, can nothing further be said
about the process of discerning the particulars?
One could reflect upon the character of analogical reasoning as this is the
mode of reasoning usually associated with law as it moves from the par-
ticular to the particular. But this is unlikely to take the matter further. For
whether an analogy is appropriate or not will tum upon our very problem,
viz., how should situations X and Y be described, or are the differences
between X and Y (and there will always be differences) sufficient to be of
legal significance. 16
The faculty of judgment has recently attracted much interest, particularly
as a topic of political philosophy.17 For modem commentators it would
appear to be a matter of whom to tum to - is it back to Aristotle or back to
Kant? Let me here speak briefly of one aspect of Kant's account of judg-
ment, viz., how he uses the notion of 'common sense'. For Kant's remarks
upon this faculty would appear helpful with regard to our problem of dis-
cerning the particulars.
v
In the Critique ofJudgment Kant famously bases aesthetic judgment upon
the sense of taste; a capacity which is usually thought of as so inherently
subjective and arbitrary that, as it is said, matters of taste cannot be disput-
ed - de gustibus non disputandum est.18 Kant's task is then to explain how
the private sensation of taste can have a public dimension. As part of this
explanation he distinguishes between two types of common sense. 'Vulgar'
common sense - the beliefs which people actually hold in common is con-
trasted with common sense understood as sensus communis:
(B)y the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a
public sense, ie a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes
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account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else,
in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective rea-
son of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from sub-
jective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for
objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence
upon its judgment. This is accomplished by weighing the judg-
ment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible,
judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of
everyone else, as the result of a mere abstraction from the limita-
tions which contingently affect our own estimate (1928: # 40).
A few lines later Kant reminds us that when we put ourselves in the posi-
tion of everyone else we should make use of three maxims of common
understanding:
They are these: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the
standpoint qf everyone else; (3) always to think consistently. The
first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought, the second that of
enlarged thought, the third that of consistent thought. The first is
the maxim of a never-passive reason... As to the second maxim
...(it) indicates a man of enlarged mind~ if he detaches himself
from the subjective personal conditions of his judgment, which
cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own
judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only deter-
mine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others). The third
maxim - that, namely, of consistent thought - is the hardest of
attainment, and is only attainable by the union of both the fonner,
and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their
observance.
Note that there is no reliance here on what appears to our eyes dead in
Kant; no mention of a method for testing judgment, no exclusion of pru-
dence as a heteronomous fann of reasoning. Speaking positively, there are
two aspects of this account which I find suggestive. In picking out these
two aspects, to be quite open about this, I am reading Kant as a precursor
of twentieth century henneneutics.19
First, Kant's discussion of sensus communis describes the conditions nec-
essary for the possibility of reflective judgment. Reflective judgment we
are told stands in need of principles.20 The idea of a public sense - sensus
communis - is the source of these principles and as such it is a presupposi-
tion of the possibility of reaching agreement about judgments.21 The pres-
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ence of this critical faculty, and the availability of interpersonal standards
for it to work upon, are both requirements of the possibility of appealing
either to or from received opinion.
To make this point in more concrete tenns. There is always a personal and
direct moment of judgment - this is a beautiful picture (for me), these cir-
cumstances evoke compassion (in me) - but the capacity to reflect upon
these experiences (a capacity which is part of commonsense in that it can
be assumed we all have this ability) transfonns this experience into some-
thing objective. All others under appropriate circumstances would take
pleasure in this picture; everyone ought to feel compassion in these cir-
cumstances. But we can only reflect upon something if we have standards.
The sensus communis provides these criteria for judgment. Not as the actu-
al judgments of others upon our initial assessment; but as our ability to
recover their possible judgments, if made under appropriate circum-
stances.22 In short, Kant's remarks on sensus communis describe the
framework for understanding how it is possible to make judgments and
achieve agreement about the relevant particulars.
The second aspect of Kant's remarks which I find attractive is his promo-
tion of the three maxims of common understanding. In the search for rele-
vant particulars these maxims can and should play an orientative role. By
this I mean that following these maxims will work to enhance the practice
of discerning the relevant particulars. The first maxim reminds decision-
makers that making a judgment is always a productive and never merely a
reproductive activity.23 As it is their judgment decision-makers should
make their own judgment; they should think for themselves and take
responsibility for what they do. 'Sapere aude' - dare to know - is of course
Kant's motto for the Enlightenment.24 The maxim of enlarged thought
counsels decision-makers against misplaced partiality; judgment must free
itself from private idiosyncrasies. This maxim encourages them to expand
their horizon of understanding and attempt to see things from the stand-
point of others. For this they need to listen to what others are saying and be
willing to allow what they hear to question their original ideas. And the
third maxim, the maxim of consistent thought, also works to guide the
decision-maker from the partial to the general. For presumably it is not just
concerned with the law of non contradiction. It insists that decision-mak-




I have spoken of compassion and deliberation, of stories and of Kanfs
account of the structure of judgment. Let me bring these threads together.
Deliberation will always involve subjectivity. After all the decision is made
by a particular person. Whether this decision-maker is suitably compas-
sionate (to stay with our example) is to a large extent a matter of chance.
People can be lucky or unlucky with their inherited temperament and
upbringing, their friendships and life experiences. Clearly no one will be
made compassionate overnight by reading a philosophical work or a novel.
But all of this is compatible with the two modest claims I make in this
paper. First, that decision-makers can be educated on the job and that read-
ing stories, and understanding the role of stories in the cultivation of senti-
ment, is part of this education. Exemplary stories can help us see the cir-
cumstances when compassion is appropriate; help us to see the particulars
clearly. But, presumably, if people can be educated they also can be mis-
educated. We can be exposed to bad stories. And even habituation to good
stories may have its price. It may harden the senses.25
Second, while philosophy cannot dictate to the act of judgment it can sug-
gest practices and strategies which are conducive to good judgment. Kant's
three maxims of common understanding are an example of this. If followed
they do not guarantee a proper discernment of the particulars but they are
more likely than not to lead in this direction.26
But if there is an ineradicable personal moment to deliberation there is also
an inevitable inter-personal moment. Someone decides, but that person is
always socially and culturally situated. The finding that these circum-
stances warrant a compassionate response, is not simply a statement about
the decision-maker's private feelings. It is a judgment that the experience
of compassion is here appropriate. It is a claim that any fair-minded person
in the decision-maker's position would make this judgment. Stories playa
role in providing the examples necessary for the justification of judgments.
The community's commonsense, both actual and idealised, is a source of
'these stories; as is the institutional setting in which the decision is to be
made. All of these contexts provide criteria for assessing, and just as
importantly for publicly re-assessing, judgments about compassion. As to
the present character of these criteria and the possibility ofuncovering their
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NOTES
1 Quoted by Martha Nussbaum (1990: 54)
2 For a recent philosophical discussion of the notion of compassion see Lawrence Blum
(1994: 173-182)
3 Except the feeling of 'respect for the law' .
4 And my remarks in section V indicate a possible response to the influential thesis con-
cerning the fragmentation of value spheres.
5 For example Lynne Henderson (1987), William Brennan (1988), Martha Minow &
Elizabeth Spelman (1988) and from another perspective Paul Gerwitz (1988).
6 Ie this is an expectation of contemporary legal practice
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7 The examples are suggested by Simone Weil (1978: 177)
8 See the provisions allowing for the suspension of deportation in America and the
United Kingdom; immigration & Nationality Act 1982 sI254(a)(l) and Rule 364
Statement ofChanges in Immigration Rules (He 395) 23 March 1994, respectively.
9 For a good discussion of the struggle between the courts and the bureaucracy over the
meaning of these provisions see Evan Arthur (1991)
10 I will ignore the complication that these regulations themselves were superseded by
the Migration (1993) Regulations. As Class 812 of these later regulations more or less
reproduces reg 131A(l), references in the text to reg 131A should be taken to include its
after life as reg 1.3, para 812.
11 All defined terms in the regulations.
12 See the objects section (s 4) of the present Migration Act 1958. On this point also note
Immigration: A Commitment to Australia~ Report of the Committee to Advise on
Australian Immigration Policies, Canberra 1988, p 21f and MIEA v Teo (1995) 157 FCR
194
13 I say this not just because of the content of these two types of stories but also because
of their form. The fable is spare in form; it calls upon the reader to complete its meaning.
The television comedy ,can be counted upon to fully explain its meaning. Walter Benjamin
makes this point with effect by way of the strange story of the Egyptian King
Psammenitus, as told by Herodotus; see 'The Storyteller' (1973: 89)
14 See Nussbaum (1990), esp. ch 12
15 Martha Nussbaum (1990) among others
16 The recent article on this topic by Cass Sunstein (1993) is so successful for the very
reason that he does not limit himself to describing the structure of this type of reasoning
17 A revival stimulated by the writings of Hannah Arendt. See, for example, H Arendt
(1982), Ronald Beiner (1983), Peter Steinberger (1993)
18 A point I take directly from Arendt (1992: 65)
19 Despite Gadamer's negative remarks (in Truth & Method) about Kant's treatment of
sensus communis (1982: 39·50). For readings along these lines see Rudolf Makkreel
(1990) esp ch. 8 and Howard Caygill (1989)
20 To paraphrase the famous remark in Kant (1928: 180)
21 See also Kant (1928) at #20
22 For a nice discussion of the role of ideal circumstances in establishing the sensus
communis - though one which comes to different conclusions from my discussion - see
Patrick Hogan (1994)
23 See also Kant (1928), comment on #22
24 'What Is Enlightenment' in Kant (1963)
25 Although it is possible to feel compassion less but do more to relieve it. On this point
note the interesting remarks of Bishop Butler:
'Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to
relieve it; but let a man set himself to attend, to inquire out, and relieve distressed per-
sons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of
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life, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the time, benevolence, consid-
ered not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action will strengthen: and whilst he
passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to
assist and befriend them.'
Works ofJoseph Butler, ed., Gladstone 1, Ill. Quoted by Norman Fiering (1976) at 213.
26 As I have brought together the topic of the role of stories in educating the sentiments
with Kant's practical philosophy I should at least indicate that it is a matter of some con-
troversy whether.Kant's account of morality can deal satisfactorily with the emotions. For
a recent discussion of this matter see Paul Guyer (1993) esp ch 10 and the Book
Symposium given over to this work in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research (1995)
55/2 357-391.
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